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ARTICLE 
Ensuring that Imported Biofuels Abide by 
Domestic Environmental Standards: Will the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Tolerate Asymmetrical Compliance Regimes? 
DANIELLE SPIEGEL FELD' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From an environmental standpoint, not all biofuels are alike. 
If produced from sustain ably harvested feedstocks using energy 
efficient production processes, biofuels can help to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the transportation sector.1 
If, however, biofuels are produced from unsustainably harvested 
feedstocks using energy intensive production processes, biofuels 
can have the opposite GHG effect,2 causing significant non-
climate related environmental harm as well.3 
* Nee Danielle Spiegel, Ph.D fellow, Copenhagen University Faculty of Law. 
This article was originally prepared for, and presented at, the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature's 2011 conference on "Biofuels Law and 
Policy," hosted by the University of Ottawa. It is current as of September 10, 
2011. The author would like to thank Tomer Broude and Stephanie Switzer for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts as well as Peter Pagh and Laura 
Nielsen for their continued guidance throughout my research efforts. 
1. The Complicated Case of Biofuels, WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 29, 2006), 
http://www .wri.org/stories/2006/11/complicated -case-biofuels (explaining how 
biofuels are a potentially carbon neutral fuel source because the amount of 
carbon that is released into the atmosphere upon burning a biomass-based fuel 
corresponds to the amount of carbon that the biomass sequestered during the 
growing period). 
2. As Joseph Fargione et al. explained in their seminal article, "whether 
biofuels offer carbon savings depends on how they are produced." Joseph 
Fargione et aI., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCI. 1235, 1235 
(2008). So-called first-generation production methods, which convert the edible 
79 
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portions of corn, soybeans and other food-crops into fuel, are particularly 
problematic from a GHG emissions perspective. Concerns regarding first-
generation fuels relate to a phenomenon known as "indirect land use changes" 
(ILUC). The theory behind ILUCs derives from the fact that using food crops for 
biofuel production puts pressure on food prices in commodity markets, which 
incentivizes farmers around the world to plant more acres of the newly lucrative 
crops. Some farmers will respond to the increased demand for the biofuels crop 
by diverting existing croplands to the production of the biofuel crop. This is 
known as direct land use changes. Others, however, will respond to the global 
demand increase by clearing virgin forests and grasslands to create additional 
farm land. The clearing of land in turn causes stored carbon to be released into 
the atmosphere and decreases the potential for future carbon sequestration. 
This chain of events is known as indirect-land use changes. See generally 
Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of u.s. Croplands for Biofuels Increases 
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCI. 1238 
(2008). Fargione et al. estimated that "converting rainforests, peatlands, 
savannas or grasslands to produce food crop-based biofuels in Brazil, Southeast 
Asia, and the United States creates a 'biofuel carbon debt' by releasing 
seventeen to 420 times more C02 than the annual greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reductions that these biofuels would provide by displacing fossil fuels." 
Fargione, supra, at 1235. Tim Searchinger et al. reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the scale of GHG emissions reductions caused by land changes. See 
Searchinger, supra, at 1239. 
A number of researchers have criticized the scientific rigor of the Fargione 
and Searchinger studies. See, e.g., Herbert Halleux et al., Comparative Life 
Cycle Assessment of Two Biofuels: Ethanol from Sugar Beet and Rapeseed 
Methyl Esther, 13 INT'L J. OF LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT 184, 184 (2008) (noting 
that neither the Fargione nor Searchinger studies are based on empirical 
studies and that both papers contain "assumptions that could be critically 
discussed"). However, as Gregory M. Perry et al. have noted, "[t]he general 
criticisms regarding both the Fargione and Searchinger studies did not reject 
claims of negative environmental effects. Instead, the debate seemed to be more 
of size, scope, and effect." GREGORY PERRY ET AL., BIOFUELS PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES: SOlVIE FACTS AND ANSWERS TO COMMON 
QUESTIONS 14 (2008), available at http://arec.oregonstate.edu/sites/default/files/ 
faculty/perry /q adocument5. pdf. 
Unlike first-generation biofuels, so-called advanced biofuels make use of 
non-food crops, such as biomass waste, as well as the non-edible portion of food 
crops, such as the corn stover. As a result, the production of advanced does not 
generally affect commodities markets for food crops and thereby avoids 
incentivizing the land conversion that first generation fuels cause. See Madhu 
Khanna, Christine L. Crago & Mairi Black, Can Biofuels Be a Solution to 
Climate Change? The Implications of Land Use Change-Related Emissions for 
Policy, 1 INTERFACE Focus 233, 236 (2011); See also Lian P. Koh et al., Biofuels: 
Waste Not Want Not, 320 SCI. 1419 (2008) (touting the GHG-saving benefits of 
biofuels derived from woody biomass). 
3. See generally R. Dominguez-Faus et al., The Water Footprint of Biofuels: 
A Drink or Drive Issue? 43 ENVT. SCI. & TECH. 3005 (2009) (production of first-
generation biofuels aggravates traditional water pollution problems caused by 
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After years of undifferentiated support, the United States 
Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA)4 in 2007, which sought to selectively promote biofuels that 
are considered environmentally sustainable.5 Citing the added 
difficulty of policing the conditions under which foreign biofuels 
are produced, the regulations that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) drafted to implement the EISA, known as the 
"Renewable Fuel Standard Program" (RFS2), require foreign 
producers to follow some more exacting procedures to 
demonstrate compliance with the EISA's environmental 
requirements than their domestic counterparts. As described 
below, EPA's claim that the added difficulty of foreign 
enforcement calls for additional compliance procedures is 
plausible.6 Not surprisingly, though, foreign biofuels producers 
have cried foul. The harshest criticism has come from the 
Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA), traditionally 
the largest ethanol exporter in the world.7 Specifically, in 
response to EPA's proposed RFS2 rulemaking, UNICA submitted 
comments alleging that the imposltlOn of any additional 
compliance obligations on foreign producers violates the United 
States' duties under the law of the World Trade Organization, 
including Article III and XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)8 as well as Article 2 of the Agreement on 
farming such as nitrogen runoff and nitrogen-based groundwater pollution and 
taxes water supplies, including in regions where water is scarce, because first-
generation biofuels increase demand for crops, thereby stimulating additional 
agriculture). Converting virgin habitat to agricultural land also threatens 
biodiversity. See generally David Tilman et al., Carbon-Negative Biofuels from 
Law-Input High-Diversity Grassland Biomass, 314 SCI. 1598 (2006). 
4. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7001-8386 
(2006). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27 -38. 
6. See infra notes 40-42 with accompanying text. 
7. Though Brazil had long been the largest ethanol exported in the world, 
the United States is on track to be the leading ethanol exporter for 2011. See 
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., U.S. ON TRACK TO BECOlVIE WORLD'S LARGEST ETHANOL 
EXPORTER IN 2011 (2011), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/IATR/ 
072011_EthanoLIATRasp. 
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 
1700, 55 UN.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).9 The European Commission 
complained to EPA about the asymmetry in the proposed RFS2 
compliance procedures as well, albeit less bluntly. 10 
Conventional wisdom suggests that, where it applies, the 
TBT Agreement imposes more onerous obligations on members of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) than does the GATT 
alone.ll At least part of the fear that the TBT Agreement 
inspires derives from the fact that it contains no obvious analogue 
to Article XX of the GATT, which provides members with an 
opportunity to maintain otherwise GATT inconsistent measures 
that serve legitimate non-protectionist goals.I2 Moreover, most 
commentators believe that GATT Article XX could not be invoked 
to justify a TBT violation.I3 As such, if one assumes the TBT 
Agreement covers the sort of environmental criteria that the 
9. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal 
Instruments·Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 UN.T.S. 120 (1994) 
[hereinafter TET Agreement]; See also JOEL VELASCO, BRAZILIAN SUGARCANE 
INDUS. ASS'N (UNICA), COMMENT ON PROPOSED REGULATION OF FUELS AND FUEL 
ADDITIVES: CHANGES TO RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM (2009) 
[hereinafter UNICA's Comments], available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#ldocumentDetail;D~EPA-HQ·OAR·2005·0161·1761. For a description of 
UNICA's allegations, see infra notes 46-49 with accompanying text. 
10. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMlVIENTS TO PROPOSED REGULATION OF FUELS 
AND FUEL ADDITIVES: CHANGES TO RENEWABLE FuEL STANDARD PROGRAM (2009), 
available at http://www .regulations.gov /#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-
2005·0161·2020. 
11. See, e.g., Jan MacDonald, Domestic Regulation, International Standards 
and Technical Barriers to Trade, 4 WORLD TRADE R. 249, 252 n.3 (2005). 
12. In pertinent part, Article XX provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to 
protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement ... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. GATT, supra 
note 8 at 37·38. 
13. See Part III, infra, for more discussion on the relationship between 
Article XX and the TET Agreement. 
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RFS2 sets forth, as a number of scholars have suggested,14 
UNICA's TBT claims appear quite threatening. 
However, upon close examination of the TBT Agreement, it is 
far from clear that Article 2 of the TBT Agreement covers the 
compliance measures that UNI CA challenges. In fact, there is 
good reason to question whether the TBT Agreement applies to 
the dispute at all. If it does not, the hypothetical case would be 
considered under the rules of the GATT alone, with the resulting 
possibility of justifying the asymmetry under Article XX.15 
14. See e.g., Andrew D. Mitchell & Christopher Tan, The Consistency of the 
EU Renewable Energy Directive with the WTO Agreements (Georgetown Law, 
Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 
1485549, 2009), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi ?article= 1121 &context=fwp s_papers&sei-
redir=1#search=%22Consistency%20EU%20Renewable%20Energy%20Directive 
%20WTO%20Agreements%22 (arguing that the minimum lifecycle GHG 
emissions criteria contained in the EU Sustainability Criteria for biofuels are 
covered by the TET Agreement); see also JANE EARLEY, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., US TRADE POLICIES ON BIOFUELS AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 11 (2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/ 
2009/04015.pdf (stating with respect to the RFS2 environmental criteria that, 
"Discrimination on the basis of performance of different kinds of feedstock may 
at some point pose a problem [under the TBT Agreement],,); CAL. ENERGY COMM. 
& CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, CEC·600·2007·011·CMF, STATE ALTERNATIVE FuELS 
PLAN 82-87 (2007) (suggesting the lifecycle emissions criteria contained in the 
California Low Carbon Fuel Standard would be subject to scrutiny under the 
TBT Agreement). 
15. Notably, in an early WTO case, the Appellate Body (AB) refused to allow 
the U.S. to use Article XX(g) to justify the asymmetry of an environmental 
regulation that was found to violate Article IIl:4. See Appellate Body Report, 
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WTIDS2/ABIR (Apr. 29 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline]. 
However, unlike the compliance procedures of the RFS2 that UNICA now 
challenges, the measures at issue in U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline created 
relatively more stringent substantive obligations on foreign producers by 
requiring them to use a less advantageous method of calculating the baseline 
from which the pollutant composition of a fuel would be measured. It is quite 
possible that the AB would be more sympathetic to asymmetrical regimes that 
do not alter the substantive standards to which each group is held, as is the case 
in the RFS2 regime. See infra note 43 (describing the requirements in the RFS2 
that UNICA challenges). 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline did 
not hold that asymmetrical regulations could never be justified under Article 
XX(g). To the contrary, the AB made clear that the fact that the rule treated 
foreign parties differently did not preclude the U.S. from successfully justifying 
the measure under Article XX(g). See U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline, supra, at 21 
("[t]here is, of course, no textual basis [in Article XX(g)] for requiring identical 
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It is important for all WTO members who seek to curb the 
flow of unsustainable biofuels into their markets to understand 
the ways in which the TBT Agreement may constrain their efforts 
to craft effective compliance regimes for the implementation of 
cross-border environmental objectives. To that end, this article 
uses UNICA's challenge to the RFS2 as a case study for 
examining the extent to which the TBT Agreement prohibits 
WTO members from imposing asymmetrical compliance burdens 
on foreign and domestic biofuels producers. The analysis 
proceeds in four parts. Part II presents background information 
on the relevant United States biofuels legislation and outlines 
UNICA's claims against the U.S. legislation. Part III then 
presents a brief history of the TBT Agreement and its 
relationship to the GATT. In Part IV, the examination turns to 
explore the scope of the TBT Agreement in general and Article 2 
in particular. It surmises that if the Agreement applies to this 
treatment of domestic and imported products. Indeed, where there is identity of 
treatment - constituting real, not merely formal, equality of treatment - it is 
difficult to see how inconsistency with Article IlI:4 would have arisen in the first 
place."). While the AB asserted that the U.S. was under a duty to "explore 
adequately means . of mitigating the administrative problems relied on as 
justification for [the disputed measure]" and to "count the costs" that the 
differential treatment of foreign entities would entail, it did not state that the 
U.S. was required to ensure that the measures decided upon imposed equal 
costs on all parties. See U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline, supra, at 28. And in fact, 
the modified Rule that EPA drafted in response to the U.S.-Reformulated 
Gasoline ruling continues to require that foreign refiners follow some additional 
procedures to ensure adequate monitoring, verification and enforcement. See 
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for Gasoline 
Produced by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533, 45,533 (Aug. 28, 1997) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) C[t]his final action also includes additional 
requirements that address issues that are unique to refiners and refineries 
located outside the United States, namely those related to tracking the 
movement of gasoline from the refinery to the United States border, monitoring 
compliance with the requirements applicable to foreign refiners, and imposition 
of appropriate sanctions for violations."). None of the parties to the original 
U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline dispute has challenged the WTO consistency of the 
final rule as amended. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there were explicit indications that the 
measure at issue in US-Reformulated Gasoline had been developed expressly in 
order to protect U.S. fuel refineries. See e.g., Panel Report, United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ~ 2.13, WTIDS21R (Jan. 
29, 1996). While the AB did not formally credit this information in its reasoning, 
it is likely that it nonetheless impacted its analysis of the U.S. compliance with 
the chapeau of Art. XX. 
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dispute at all, Article 5, not Article 2, would govern the 
disposition of UNICA's claims. Accordingly, Part V analyzes 
UNICA's Article 2 claims under the rubric of Article 5. This 
analysis suggests that Article 5 leaves sufficient regulatory space 
for policy-makers to design biofuels compliance regimes as they 
believe is necessary to confidently implement their sustainability 
objectives, even where doing so requires imposing a greater 
burden on foreign and domestic producers. Part VI concludes. 
A brief disclaimer is needed before continuing further: this 
article does not attempt to prove that the specific compliance 
obligations that the RFS2 prescribes comply with the TBT 
Agreement. Instead, it seeks to sketch the boundaries of what is 
legally permissible under the TBT Agreement. The compliance 
regime of the RFS2 merely serves as a vehicle to that end. 
Consequently, the article will not inquire into whether the 
compliance obligations that EPA designed for foreign suppliers 
were motivated by genuine environmental policy concerns as 
opposed to protectionist aims, or whether EPA explored all 
possible alternatives to avoid imposing asymmetrical obligations. 
While these points would be critical if the RFS2 were actually 
challenged at the WTO, they are inapposite to an examination of 
the contours of the TBT Agreement itself. 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE 
RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD AND THE 
BRAZILIAN SUGAR ASSOCIATION'S (UNICA) 
CHALLENGES TO IT 
a_ The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2): Its Genesis and 
Structure 
Contemporary American biofuels policy is an outgrowth of 
the energy policy of the mid-1970s. Reeling from the OPEC oil 
embargo of 1973-1974, federal legislators of the day went 
searching for a source of homegrown fuel that could help wean 
the nation off its dependency on imported oi1.16 Their gaze soon 
16. See James A. Duffield, Ethanol Policy: Past, Present and Future, 53 S.D. 
L. REV. 425, 427 ·29 (2008). 
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fell upon corn,17 which grows abundantly in the United States 
and can be readily converted into ethano1.18 The government has 
aggressively supported the American biofuels industry, with 
particular emphasis on the corn ethanol sector, ever since.19 
Throughout most of this time period, federal biofuels policy 
consisted of nurturing the corn ethanol industry with a slew of 
subsidies, tax credits, and import tariffs.2o Then, in 2005, 
Congress added another tool to its arsenal: The Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 [hereinafter EPActj,21 which mandated that all 
transportation fuel sold in the United States contain a minimum 
volume of renewable fuel (i.e., biofuel).22 This new mandate to 
use renewable fuels was called the "renewable fuel standard" 
(RFS). 
The RFS required blenders to incorporate at least 4 billion 
gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and to steadily increase the 
proportion of renewable fuel to about 7.5 billion gallons by 2012.23 
To monitor compliance with the RFS mandate, each gallon of 
renewable fuel was assigned a "Renewable Identification 
Number" (RIN); regulated parties (i.e. fuel refiners, importers, 
and blenders) were required to acquire a specified quantity of 
RIN s, either through purchasing the fuel that carried them or by 
purchasing RINs from other obligated parties who had used more 
renewable fuel that they were statutorily required to use.24 
From an environmental perspective, the RFS was fatally 
flawed in that it generally treated conventional corn ethanol and 
17. Id. at 428. 
18. Corn-derived ethanol was also attractive to lawmakers as a substitute to 
petroleum fuel because it curried favor with the powerful agricultural lobby. See 
Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol: Law, Economics and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL'y 
REV. 434, 461·62 (2008) (describing the public choice pathologies that have 
helped garner legislative support for ethanol). 
19. See id. at 438·41. 
20. Id. 
21. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109·58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16524 (2005) [hereinafter EPActj. 
22. Id. § 1501(a). 
23. Id. 
24. OFFICE OF TRANSP. AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. EPA, EPA FINALIZES 
REGULATIONS FOR A RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD (RFS) PROGRAM FOR 2007 AND 
BEYOND 2 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/renewablefuels/ 
420f07019.pdf. 
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more advanced, environmentally benign, biofuels alike. Although 
the EP Act included some incentives to use advanced biofuels-
most notably by allowing cellulosic and waste-derived ethanol to 
generate 2.5 RIN credits per everyone credit that an equivalent 
volume of conventional fuel generated25-these incentives were 
not powerful enough to overcome the competitive disadvantages 
of cellulosic ethanol that were needed to make it an attractive 
substitute to conventional corn ethanol. 26 
Responding to the need to further differentiate between 
sustainable and unsustainable biofuels, the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA)27 made significant changes to the 
RFS. The first improvement in the amended RFS program 
(RFS2) is that only biofuels which confer meaningful life-cycle 
GHG savings are eligible to count toward fulfillment of the RFS2 
mandate. The baseline GHG savings requirement is that all fuel 
produced at facilities which "commenced construction" after 
December 200728 must confer a minimum of 20 percent life-cycle 
GHG reductions as compared to petroleum-based fuels.29 In 
addition, a certain percentage of the total RFS2 mandate must be 
25. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel 
Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,713 (Mar. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 80), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/ 
regulations.htm [hereinafter EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble]. 
26. Notably, despite the incentives that the EPAct provided for cellulosic 
ethanol, by October of 2007, there were still no large-scale cellulosic ethanol 
facilities in the United States that were either operating or under construction. 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BIOFUELS IN THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECTOR (2007), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaperibiomass.html. It has been 
estimated that first-of-a-kind cellulosic ethanol plants cost up to five and a half 
times as much as conventional ethanol plants with a similar production 
capacity. See id. Beyond the facility construction costs, production costs are 
also higher for cellulosic. See Jessica Leber, Economics Improve for First 
Commercial Cellulosic Etharwl Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/02/16/16climatewire-economics-improve-for-
first-commercial-cell u -934 78.h tml. 
27. Energy Independence and Security Act § 1522. 
28. As an aside, EPA's implementing regulations grandfathered a large 
percentage of corn ethanol so that most of the corn ethanol that is actually used 
to fulfill the RFS2 mandate will not actually have to comply with the 20 percent 
GHG reduction threshold. See Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable 
Fuel Standard Eventually End Ethanol's Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 672 
(2010). 
29. Energy Independence and Security Act § 202(a)(I). 
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fulfilled with fuels that confer more than 20 percent GHG 
reductions. Specifically, the general mandate to use "renewable 
fuel" includes a nested sub-mandate to consume a given quantity 
of "advanced biofuels,"3o defined as those biofuels which provide 
at least 50 percent GHG savings.31 Within the advance biofuels 
sub-mandate, there is a further sub-mandate to use an amount of 
cellulosic biofuel and biomass based diesel, which are each 
required to confer at least 60 percent GHG emissions savings.32 
In order to ensure that a particular type of fuel complies with 
these GHG savings requirements, EPA models the lifecycle GHG 
emlSSlOns associated with biofuel produced from various 
feedstock and production processes.33 Mter analyzing a given 
feedstock and production pathway combination-for instance, 
ethanol derived from corn made at a facility that uses natural gas 
for process energy-EPA decides whether that type of fuel is 
eligible to count towards fulfillment of one of the nested 
mandates (conventional, advanced, cellulosic, or biomass based 
diesel) or is ineligible to generate RIN s at all.34 Notably, EPA 
may declare that certain types of feedstocks cannot be used to 
produce RIN -eligible fuel, regardless of the production process 
used. At the time of this writing, EPA has not yet exercised this 
option but also has not yet issued finallifecycle analyses for some 
highly suspect feedstocks such as palm oil diesel. 
In addition to the GHG thresholds, the RFS2 also 
significantly restricts the type ofland from which RIN -generating 
biofuel feedstock can be harvested. More precisely, only 
feedstocks harvested from certain types of land can be labeled 
"renewable biomass,"35 and only biofuels made from "renewable 
biomass" are eligible to be classified as "renewable fuel"36 and 
thereby generate RIN s. These land use restrictions serve both to 
30. Id. § 202(a)(2). 
31. Id. § 201(1)(B)(i). 
32. Id. §§ 201(1)(D), 201(1)(E). 
33. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,677. Importantly, 
in calculating lifecycle GHG emissions, EPA includes emissions that are the 
result of Indirect Land Use Changes (ILUCs). Energy Independence and 
Security Act § 201(1)(H); see supra note 2 for a discussion of ILUCs. 
34. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,678. 
35. Energy Independence and Security Act § 201(1)(1). 
36. Id. § 201(1)(J). 
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mlmmize the GHG emissions associated with the production of 
the fuels, by reducing the amount of land that is cleared to grow 
biofuel crops, as well as to protect biodiversity, by preventing 
biologically rich land from being converted for biofuel feedstock 
production.37 The most important land use restriction is that 
planted crops can only be used to create RIN -eligible fuel if they 
are harvested from existing agricultural land. 38 
The environmental community generally lauded the 
environmental safeguards of the RFS2 as being critical to the 
transition towards a sustainable biofuels policy.39 The trouble 
with these safeguards, however, is that they may be difficult to 
enforce. As Nathaniel Greene of the Natural Resources Defense 
Council noted in his testimony to the U.S. Senate, "[m]uch of the 
information that EPA, or accredited certifiers, will need to 
determine the lifecycle GHG emissions of different biofuels and 
compliance with the definition of 'renewable biomass' can only be 
gathered on the farm, in the forest, or at the biofuel refinery."40 
In other words, whereas in some contexts EPA can simply 
examine a product to determine whether it complies with a 
technical specification, it cannot do so with a batch of biofuel 
because the specifications it is concerned with in that context, by 
and large, leave no trace in the final product. 
37. See EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,692 (explaining 
its decision to exclude rangeland from the definition of "agricultural land" on the 
grounds that "the conversion of relatively undisturbed rangeland to the 
production of annual crops could in some cases lead to large releases of GHGs 
stored in the soil, as well as a loss of biodiversity, both of which would be 
contrary to EISA's stated goals."). 
38. See Energy Independence and Security Act § 201(1)(I)(i) (stating that 
"renewable biomass" can only be made from "[p]lanted crops and crop residue 
harvested from agricultural land that was cleared or cultivated at any time 
prior to the enactment of [the EISA]"). 
39. See generally Environmental Protection Agency Oversight: Implementing 
the Renewable Fuel Standard: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clear Air and 
Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env. and Pub. Works, 1l0th Congo (2008) 
(statement of Nathaniel Greene, Dir. of Renewable Energy Policy, NRDC), 
available at http://docs.nrdc.org/airlfiles/air_0807ll0la.pdf. 
40. See id. at 39. 
11
90 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
h. The Asymmetrical Compliance Procedures of the RFS2 
and UNICA's Challenge to Them 
As noted in the introduction, EPA argues that the need for 
on·site information gathering makes it difficult to ensure that 
imported biofuels comply with the RFS2's environmental criteria. 
These concerns are likely exacerbated by the fact that Brazil, 
again, traditionally the world's largest exporter, has a history of 
unreliable compliance with and enforcement of its own domestic 
environmental laws,41 which may make EPA hesitant to depend 
on cooperation with the local Brazilian authorities to ensure 
compliance. To compensate for these added difficulties, EPA 
obligates foreign biofuel suppliers to follow some additional or 
more exacting compliance procedures than domestic suppliers 
must follow. EPA explains that this disparate treatment reflects 
"the more limited access that EPA enforcement personnel have to 
foreign entities that are regulated parties under RFS2, and also 
the fact that foreign ·produced biofuel intended for export to the 
U.S. is often mixed with biofuel that will not be exported to the 
U.S."42 
To provide an idea of the nature of asymmetry at issue here, 
the following is a list of some additional compliance and 
enforcement procedures that foreign biofuel producers and 
importers must abide by to generate RINs. They must: submit 
third party engineering reports detailing their production 
process, post a bond that can be used in potential enforcement 
proceedings against them as a condition to register under the 
RFS2 process, physically segregate RIN ·eligible fuel from all 
other fuel and keep it separate throughout the distribution 
network, and satisfy additional record·keeping requirements to 
document implementation ofland use restrictions.43 
UNICA claims the additional obligations impose "substantial 
administrative impediments"44 and "prohibitive costs"45 on 
41. Colin Crawford, Defending Public Prosecutors and Defining Brazil's 
Environmental "Public Interest"; A Review of Lesley McAllister's Making Law 
Matter: Environmental Protection and Legal Institutions in Brazil, 40 
GEO.WASH. INT'L L. REV. 620, 624 (2009). 
42. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,712. 
43. Id. 
44. UNICA's Comments, supra note 9, at 35. 
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foreign renewable fuel producers, which have the effect of 
impeding imports from entering the American market place.46 
They therefore argue that the additional measures violate TBT 
Article 2.1 and GATT Article IlI:4 by according "less favorable 
treatment" to foreign produced biofuels, and GATT Article XI: 1 by 
restricting imports.47 They further allege that EPA has "less 
restrictive alternatives" available to ensure the requirements of 
the RFS2 are met. In consequence, UNICA contends that the 
current regime creates "unnecessary obstacles to trade," in 
contravention of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.48 Critically, 
UNICA suggests that discriminatory measures need not create 
any particular degree of "less favorable treatment" or be 
motivated by any protectionist aim to violate the stated 
provisions. To the contrary, they argue that "any less favourable 
treatment of foreign [renewable fuel producers] in connection 
with documentation requirements concerning land use 
restrictions and handling of feedstocks ... is in contravention of 
TBT Article 2.1 and 2.2, as well as Article IlI:4 and XI: of the 
GATT."49 UNICA appears to believe the relevant provisions of 
the Agreements categorically ban asymmetrical compliance 
regImes. 
c. Presentation of the Operative Provisions 
Because they factor so prominently in the later analysis, it is 
appropriate to briefly examine the texts of Article IlI:4 of the 
GATT, as well as Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. 
First, expressing one of the foundational principles of WTO 
law, the national treatment obligation, Article IlI:4 of the GATT 
obliges members to ensure that their internal regulations do not 
discriminate against foreign goods. The core of the provision 





49. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
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The products of the territory of any contracting party imported 
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use,50 
In language closely resembling that used in Article IlI:4, 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement sets forth a complementary 
"national treatment" obligation for a subset of "laws, regulations 
and requirements," namely, technical regulations. It states that: 
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, 
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any 
other country. 51 
Article 2.2, in turn establishes what is typically referred to as 
a "least trade restrictive alternative" obligation for technical 
regulations. In pertinent part it reads: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this 
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.52 
P arts III and IV of this article will provide a more detailed 
analysis of these provisions and the complicated interplay 
between them. First, though, this next section presents some 
background information on the TBT Agreement and its 
relationship to the GATT. 
50. GATT, supra note 8, at Art. 111:4. 
51. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 2.1. 
52. Id. at art. 2.2. 
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III. THE ORIGINS OF THE TBT AGREEMENT AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE GATT 
a. Origins of the TBT Agreement 
Throughout the early years of the GATT, parties to the 
agreement focused on reducing overt barriers to trade.53 This is 
to say that the focus was on reducing tariffs and other measures 
that operated "at the border" to conspicuously block access to the 
parties' national markets.54 Over time, as the GATT regime 
achieved considerable success in reducing these explicit 
barriers,55 the workings of another more invidious form of trade 
discrimination came into the spotlight-internal domestic 
regulations that, while purportedly adopted to further important 
policy objectives such as consumer safety and environmental 
protection, also have the effect of restricting imports.56 These 
measures, which are referred to as non·tariff trade barriers 
(NTBs), may be facially non·discriminatory and motivated by 
genuine concern and yet still meaningfully slow the wheels of 
international trade. As Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse 
have explained, "even when there is no protectionist intent on the 
part of lawmakers, through a lack of coordination, mere 
differences in regulatory or standard· setting regimes can function 
to impede trade."57 
53. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 202 (3d ed. 2005). 
54.Id. 
55. Id. at 193. 
56. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN, NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 1-2 (1970). Baldwin colorfully explained that, "the lowering of tariffs has, 
in effect, been like draining a swamp ... [t]he lower water level has revealed all 
the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away." 
Id. at2. 
57. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 202. Of course, facially neutral 
product regulations also provide fertile ground for disguising protectionist 
intentions. On this point, the EC-Asbestos panel observed that, "the purpose of 
adopting the TET Agreement was to control the development and application of 
standards-situations in which protectionist aims can be better disguised [than 
in import bans} and for which the existing disciplines within the GATT 
appeared to be inadequate," Panel Report, European Communities - Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ~ 8.49, WTIDS1351R (Sept. 
18,2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC-Asbestos] (emphasis added). 
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The national treatment obligations of the GATT are phrased 
in broad enough terms to incorporate many (if not most) product 
regulations and therefore impose some discipline on such 
measures.58 Yet, by the late 1960s it was clear to the parties to 
the GATT that the existing framework was insufficient to rein in 
the proliferation of divergent product regulations that were 
causing unnecessary inefficiencies. 59 The parties therefore 
agreed to negotiate a new instrument.6o From the outset, though, 
they were clear that the putative new instrument should "in no 
way interferer 1 with the responsibility of governments for safety, 
health and welfare of their people, or the protection of the 
environment in which they live."61 Instead, it would "merely seek 
. . . to minimize the effect of such actions on international 
trade."62 
The first agreement to specifically tackle product regulations 
was titled the "Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade"63 
(commonly referred to as the "Standards Code"). Negotiated 
during the Tokyo Round, the Standards Code entered into force in 
1980.64 The Standards Code supplemented the non-
discrimination obligations of the GATT by subjecting product 
regulations to an additional layer of scrutiny. Gabrielle Marceau 
and Joel Trachtman have succinctly described the agreement in 
the following terms: 
58. See GATT, supra note 8, at art. IlI:4 ("The products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use.") (emphasis added). 
59. See MacDonald, supra note 11, at 251; see also Gabrielle Marceau & Joel 
P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811,814 (2002). 
60. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 814. 
61. Id. (quoting Spec (71) 143 § III, Art. l(c) (Sept. 30, 1971)). 
62. Id. 
63. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, 
1186 UN.T.S. 276. 
64. Doaa Abdel Motaal, The "Multilateral Scientific Consensus" and the 
World Trade Organization, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 855, 855 (2004). 
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Its main provisions prohibited discrimination and the protection 
of domestic production through specifications, technical 
regulations and standards; it also proscribed the preparation, 
adoption and application of regulations, specifications and 
standards in a manner more restrictive than necessary; and it 
urged signatories to base their national measures on 
international standards and to collaborate and co-operate 
towards harmonization of such national norms.65 
95 
Regrettably, the Standards Code proved ineffective at 
curbing disruptions to trade caused by product regulations.66 
Several different shortcomings contributed to this failure. First, 
the Standards Code was ridden with vague or ambiguous rules, 
which made it difficult for parties to determine its effect ex ante.67 
Beyond this, only forty-three of the parties to the GATT ever 
assented to the agreement.68 The limited membership meant 
that technical regulations in a large number of GATT member 
states fell outside of the Standards Code's reach. Finally, the 
Standards Code only covered measures that "lay down 
characteristics of a product such as levels of quality, performance, 
safety or dimension." This phrase was interpreted as excluding 
process and production methods (PPMs).69 
Each of these deficiencies was addressed during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. To cure defects resulting from the limited 
number of signatories, which had undermined other plurilateral 
GATT-era agreements as well, the negotiating parties established 
the rule of the "single undertaking." The single undertaking put 
65. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 814. 
66. See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: 
POLITICS, LAw, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 135 (2006). 
67. Id. 
68. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 814. 
69. BARTON ET AL., supra note 66, at 135 (citing Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, supra note 63, annex 1(1)). (Barton et al. lists a fourth reason 
for the Standard Code's failure as well: the consensus-based dispute settlement 
procedure that was in force under the GATT permitted any party to a dispute to 
veto a panel's report from being adopted); see also BARTON ET AL., supra note 66, 
at 69-71 (explaining the workings of the consensus-based GATT dispute 
settlement). As the consensus-based dispute settlement procedure was 
abandoned when the WTO came into being, this is no longer an impediment to 
the effective implementation of the TBT Agreement. BARTON ET AL., supra note 
66, at 70·71. 
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an end to the pre-Uruguay Round practice of enabling Members 
of the GATT to pick and choose which additional trade 
instruments they wished to join. Under the new arrangement, 
states would have to assent to all agreements covered by the 
WTO as a condition of membership. 70 The provisions of the 
Standards Code were also made more precise and language was 
inserted to grant jurisdiction over process and production 
methods71 (though, as will be discussed in Part III, there is still 
some ambiguity as to the extent to which PPMs were effectively 
included). Furthermore, the Standards Code was split into two 
separate instruments: the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures72 (SPS Agreement) and the present-day 
TBT Agreement. The SPS Agreement was given dominion over 
measures designed to protect "human, animal, and plant life or 
health."73 The TBT Agreement, by contrast, was made 
responsible for product regulations and standards that further a 
broader range of policy objectives, including environmental 
protection.74 It was explicitly not, however, to cover any 
measures that fit within the SPS Agreement's mandate. 75 
70. BARTON ET AL., supra note 66, at 47. 
71. Id. at 136. 
72. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Apr. 151994, 1867 UN.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
73. Id. at annex A. ,-r 1. To date, the SPS Agreement has been applied almost 
exclusively to regulations that concern risks posed by the importation of food 
and agricultural products. ROBERT HOWSE, PETRUS VAN BORK & CHARLOTTE 
HABERBRAND, WTO DISCIPLINES AND BIOFUELS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
IN THE CREATION OF A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 23 (2006). 
74. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at annex 1, ,-r 1. 
75. Id. at art. 1.5 ("[t]he provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures as defined in Annex A of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures."). 
As an aside, delineating the precise relationship between the jurisdiction of the 
SPS and TET Agreements poses, as Jacqueline Peel has put it, "a number of 
thorny questions." Jacqueline Peel, A GMO by Any Other Name . .. Might be an 
SPS Risk!; Implications of Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1009, 1014 (2006). These 
issues became even more complex after the release of the EC-Biotechs panel 
report in the fall of 2006, which seemed to expand the scope of the SPS 
Agreement into a domain that was once believed to be reserved for the TET 
Agreement. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTIDS2911R, WTDS2921R, 
WTIDS2931R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotechs]. The unappealed EC-
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Residual non-tariff regulations that fell outside the scope of 
either the SPS or the TBT Agreement were assigned to the GATT 
alone.76 This division of labor between the agreements remains 
in place today. 
b_ Raising the stakes: increasing fears of interference 
with national regulatory prerogative 
The shift in focus from border measures to internal measures 
that the TBT Agreement heralded carried important political 
implications as it increased the probability that WTO law would 
encroach upon Member states' right to pursue national policy 
objectives as they saw fit.77 As previously noted, the parties to 
the GATT foresaw the potential for this sort of conflict to arise 
before even commencing negotiations on the Standards Code and 
indicated a desire to avoid intruding upon legitimate expressions 
of regulatory autonomy.78 The final text of the TBT Agreement 
demonstrates sensitivity to this issue as well. Perhaps most 
significantly, it allows parties to maintain trade-distorting 
technical regulations that are necessary to fulfill a "legitimate 
Biotechs decision also suggested that a single measure with multiple distinct 
purposes could be considered both an SPS and TET measure. Id. ,-r,-r 7.164-65. 
This article will not delve into the nuance of the SPS-TET interplay, nor will it 
evaluate the feasibility of bringing an SPS claim against the RFS2. The reason 
for this is that UNreA, like most academic commentators, focused exclusively on 
the potential friction with the TET Agreement, which still appears the far more 
likely avenue of attack. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tan, supra note 14 (acknowledging 
that there may be a conflict between EU Sustainability Criteria for biofuels and 
the TET Agreement or the GATT while omitting any discussion of a potential 
conflict with the SPS Agreement). 
76. Peel, supra note 75, at 1014. 
77. The possibility of the WTO meddling with national regulatory prerogative 
in this way has sparked fierce controversy over the years and made many 
concerned citizens, particularly environmentalists, skeptical of the free trade 
agenda. See ROBERT HOWSE & ELIZABETH TURK, THE WTO IMPACT ON INTERNAL 
REGULATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADA-EC ASBESTOS DISPUTE 283-84 
(Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott, eds., 2001). For an excellent examination of 
the tension between free trade and regulatory autonomy in the TBT Agreement, 
see generally 1v1ichael Ming Du, Domestic Regulatory Autonomy Under the TBT 
Agreement: From Non-Discrimination to Harmonization, 6 CHINESE J. OF INT'L L. 
269 (2007). 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. 
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objective."79 Paragraph 6 of the preamble reinforces this 
prerogative by stipulating that "no country should be prevented 
from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its 
exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive 
practices, at the levels it considers appropriate."80 Unfortunately, 
it is not always clear how to apply this preambulatory statement 
when interpreting the articles in the body of the Agreement. As 
will become evident in Part IV, to a certain extent, the weight 
that one assigns to this pre ambulatory statement will determine 
one's understanding of the overall balance that the TBT 
Agreement strikes between trade facilitation and the 
preservation of domestic regulatory autonomy. 
c. Applying the GATT and TBT agreements in tandem: 
overlapping jurisdiction but disparate outcomes 
As UNICA's challenge to the RFS2 indicates, it is often the 
case that both the GATT and the TBT Agreement apply to a 
single dispute or measure.81 Concurrent application of the TBT 
Agreement and the GATT makes sense in light of the similar 
goals that the two agreements advance.82 At the same time, the 
rules that each agreement prescribes are of course not identical. 
Rather, as the Appellate Body explained in EC-Asbestos,83 the 
TBT Agreement "imposes obligations on Members that seem to be 
different from, and additional to, the obligations imposed on 
Members under the GATT 1994."84 The overlapping jurisdiction 
of the GATT and TBT Agreement, combined with disparate 
obligations that each imposes, creates a possibility that two 
agreements would prescribe conflicting outcomes in a given 
79. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 2.2. 
SO. Id. at pmbl. ~ 6. 
81. See STEVE CHARNOVITZ, JANE EARLEY & ROBERT HOWSE, AN EXAMINATION 
OF SOCIAL STANDARDS IN BIOFUELS SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA 16 (2008), available 
at http://www . agri trade .org Idocuments/Social Stnds_Biofuels_FIN AL. pdf. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65. 
83. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTIDS135/ABIR (Mar. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter EC-Asbestos]. 
S4. Id. ~ SO (emphasis in original). 
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dispute. The most obvious source of potential conflict concerns 
the application of GATT Article XX. 
The Dispute Settlement Body has yet to formally determine 
whether Article XX can excuse a violation of the TBT 
Agreement.85 Granting it is conceivable that Article XX could be 
used to such effect, scholars who have examined the issue have 
traditionally dismissed this possibility.86 The recent case law on 
the subject, while not entirely conclusive, has also generally 
supported the notion that Article XX cannot be used to this 
effect.87 
85. Panels have been confronted with this issue on at least two prior 
occaSIOns. In both instances, however, it declined to address the issue for 
reasons of judicial economy. See Panel Report, European Communities-
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Product 
and Foodstuffs, n 7.440-7.476, WTIDS2901R (Mar. 15,2005) [hereinafter EC-
Trademark]; Panel Report, EC-Biotechs, supra note 75, n 4.385, 7.2524·5, 
WTIDS2911R, WTIDS2921R, WTIDS293 (Sept. 29, 2006). 
86. See, e.g., Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 874 (stating that it 
would take a "heroic approach to interpretation" to find that Article XX could be 
invoked to justify a violation under another agreement in annex lA.); id. at 823 
(stating that "[i]t is doubtful whether Article XX (or XXI) was expected to be 
available to be invoked as a defence to a claim of violation of [TBT] Article 2.2"). 
87. For a brief while, following the release of the China - Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products Appellate Body report in 2009, the idea 
that Article XX could be applied to the TBT Agreement seemed fairly plausible. 
Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, n 205·33, WTIDS363/ABIR (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China-
Audiovisuals]. In that case, the Appellate Body held that GATT Article XX 
could be used as a defense against an alleged breach of the Chinese Accession 
Protocol, despite the fact that the Accession protocol did not explicitly refer to 
Article XX. See id. 
The China-Audiovisuals holding was based on the interpretation of the 
phrase, "[w]ithout prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a manner 
consistent with the WTO Agreement," which appeared in the introductory 
sentence of Article 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol. The Appellate Body read 
this phrase as incorporating into Article 5.1 a reserved right for China to 
regulate the trade of goods in a manner that is provided by GATT Article XX. 
See id. Because this holding is grounded in the language of one particular 
clause of China's Accession Protocol, it is not applicable to other agreements or 
even other provisions of the Accession Protocol. In fact, in a subsequent dispute, 
China-Measures Relating to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China-
Raw Materials), a panel refused to permit China to invoke Article XX as a 
defense against a breach of a different provision of its Accession Protocol. See 
Panel Report, China-Measures Relating to the Exportation of Various Raw 
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Assuming Article XX is in fact unavailable to TBT litigants 
as a defense, there is a real possibility that a measure that 
comports with the GATT would nonetheless violate the TBT 
Agreement. In cases of conflict such as this, the General 
Interpretative Note to Annex lA of the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization explains that the rule set forth in 
latter agreement should prevail,88 which in this case is the TBT 
Agreement. As the TBT Agreement does not offer any further 
guidance on how to resolve conflicts with the GATT, the General 
Interpretive Note provides the fallback position.89 Accordingly, if 
a measure were to comply with the GATT, due to Article XX, but 
were inconsistent with the TBT Agreement, the measure would 
have to be struck down. 
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE TBT AGREEMENT: DOES 
THE TBT AG REEMENT APPLY, AND IF SO, 
WHICH PROVISIONS WOULD GOVERN THE 
DISPUTE? 
a. "Technical Regulations" and "Standards" 
The 
measures: 
TBT Agreement only covers 
"technical regulations,"90 
three categories of 
"standards,"91 and 
Materials, n 7.116·29, WTIDS3941R, WTIDS3951R, WTIDS3981R (July 5, 2011). 
Furthermore, in the most recent case to present this issue, United States-Clove 
Cigarettes, the U.S. decided to not even raise the possibility of using Article XX 
to defend its ban on clove cigarettes from attack under Article 2 of the TET 
Agreement. See Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production 
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ~ 7.296, WTIDS4061R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter 
U.S.-Clove Cigarettes]. Taken together, the evidence suggests that Article XX 
could not be invoked to defend against alleged violations of the TET Agreement. 
88. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
89. Cf, SPS Agreement, supra note 72, at art. 2.4 (stating that "[s]anitary or 
phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of 
Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of article XX(b)"). 
90. See TET Agreement, supra note 9, at arts. 2-3 (governing Technical 
Regulations) . 
91. See id. at art. 4 (governing "Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards"). 
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"conformity assessment procedures."92 If a non-tariff barrier does 
not fit within the ambit of one of these three terms it will not be 
subject to the rules that the TBT Agreement sets forth. 
Therefore, a threshold question in any TBT analysis is whether 
the measure at issue satisfies the definition of either "technical 
regulation," "standard," or "conformity assessment procedure." 
The term "conformity assessment procedures" is a derivative 
term that incorporates the terms "technical regulations" and 
"standards" into its definition. 93 As a result, even if one were to 
ultimately conclude that the challenged compliance measures are 
"conformity assessment procedures," for them to be covered by 
the TBT Agreement, the requirements they seek to enforce would 
have to count as either "technical regulations" or "standards." 
For this reason, we must begin by examining whether the 
environmental objectives contained in the challenged portion of 
the RFS294 fit within either of these two categories. 
Looking first at "Technical Regulations," Annex 1.1 of the 
Agreement defines the term to mean: 
[A] [d]ocument, which lays down product characteristic or their 
related processes and production methods, including applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. 
It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method.95 
The term "Standards" is defined quite similarly to "Technical 
Regulations," with the primary difference being that compliance 
92. See id. at arts. 5-8 (governing "Conformity with Technical Regulations 
and Standards"). 
93. See id. at annex 1.3 (stating that "[a]ny procedure used, directly or 
indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or 
standards are fulfilled."). 
94. See US-Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 15, at 14 (indicating that the 
Dispute Settlement Body should evaluate the character of the challenged 
portion of a regulation, and not the regulation as a whole, when evaluating its 
WTO consistency). 
95. TBT Agreement, supra note 9, at Annex 1.1 (emphasis added). 
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with the former is voluntary, whereas compliance with the latter 
is mandatory.96 
Because "mandatory" is not defined in the TBT Agreement, a 
question arises as to whether a regulation which makes 
compliance a precondition for receiving a certain privilege, but 
not for selling one's goods in the national market without such 
privilege, should be considered "mandatory." This distinction is 
relevant to the classification of the RFS2 because, as mentioned 
in Part II, the RFS2 does not require biofuels to be sustainable to 
be sold in the US; instead, biofuels must only be produced 
sustainably to generate RINs.97 
For better or worse, the relevant WTO precedent strongly 
indicates that measures that must be complied with in order to 
receive privileged market access will be treated as mandatory 
under the TBT Agreement. Specifically, in prior cases where non-
compliance with the conditions set forth in a regulation created 
appreciable trade disadvantages for that party, the Dispute 
Settlement Body has deemed the relevant regulation to be de 
facto mandatory, even where compliance was not necessary to 
market the good.98 As the ability to generate RINs confers 
significant market advantages upon renewable fuel 
producers/importers, the RFS2 rule would therefore probably be 
96. "Standard" is defined as a "(d)ocument approved by a recognized body, 
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics 
for products or related processes and production methods, with which 
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they 
apply to a product, process or production method." TET Agreement, supra note 
4, at annex 1.2. See also Du, supra note 77, ,-r 34 (noting that the primary 
difference between technical regulations and standards is that compliance with 
technical regulations is mandatory whereas compliance with standards is 
optional). 
97. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,713. 
98. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Descriptions of 
Sardines, ~ 194, WTIDS2311ABIR (Sept. 26, 2002) (finding that a regulation 
which set down restrictions on which species of fish that could be marketed as 
"Sardines" in the EU counted as "mandatory" although species of fish that were 
not eligible to be labeled "Sardines" could still being marketed in the EU under 
another name); see also EC-Trademark, supra note 85, ,-r,-r 7.453-56 (finding that 
a regulation with which compliance was necessary in order to receive the 
benefits of registration was "mandatory" as that term is used in the definition of 
"technical regulation"). 
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considered mandatory. If it is either, then, the relevant portion of 
the RFS2 would likely be classified as a regulation and not a 
standard. 
i. The controversy over "unincorporated PPMs" 
And yet, there is still a distinct possibility that a panel would 
find that the RFS2 falls outside the definition of "technical 
regulation." The reason for caution on this matter harkens back 
to a controversy that seems omnipresent in the trade-and-
environment discourse-namely, the debate over so-called 
"unincorporated process and production methods" 
(unincorporated PPMs). 
Many WTO commentators advocate dividing the universe of 
PPMs into two discrete categories: incorporated PPMs and 
unincorporated PPMs.99 Broadly speaking, incorporated PPMs 
seek to ensure the functionality or safety of goods in order to 
protect the consumer who purchases them. An example of a 
product-related PPM would be a regulation that forbids the 
importation of shrimp that have been processed at facilities that 
do not treat the shrimp with a certain anti-microbial solution. 
Unincorporated PPMs, by contrast, seek to achieve some social 
objective and do not tangibly impact the final good. An example 
of an unincorporated PPM would be a regulation that forbids the 
importation of shrimp that have been harvested in a way which 
that may harm local marine life. 
Those arguing in favor of applying this distinction to the TBT 
Agreement typically point to the phrase "product characteristics 
or their related processes and production methods" in the 
definition of "technical regulation." As the argument goes, the 
fact that PPMs must be "related to" a product characteristic to 
99. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 11, at 255; l\IIitchell & Tan, supra note 14, 
n 39·41; Du, supra note 77, ~ 40. See also Steve Charnovitz, The Law of 
Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 59, 65·66 (2002) (noting that while the related/unrelated distinction is 
overly simplistic there is support for the distinction in the text and negotiating 
history of the TET Agreement and it is pervasive in the relevant scholarly 
discourse). 
25
104 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
count as a technical regulation suggests that only incorporated 
PPMs are covered by the TBT Agreement.IOO 
Even though the argument is not without controversy,IOI it 
finds considerable support in the Appellate Body report from EC-
Asbestos. In EC-Asbestos the Appellate Body gave the following 
interpretation of "product characteristics": 
Thus, the ({characteristics" of a product include, In our VIew, any 
objectively definable ({features)), ({ qualities)), ({ attributes)), or other 
({distinguishing mark" of a product. Such ({characteristics)) might 
relate, inter alia, to a product's composition, size, shape, colour, 
texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity, 
density, or viscosity. In the definition of ((technical regulation)) in 
Annex 1.1, the TBT Agreement itself gives certain examples of 
({product characteristics)) - ({terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labeling requirements)). These examples indicate 
that ({product characteristics)) include, not only features and 
qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related 
({characteristics," such as the means of indication, the 
presentation and the appearance of a product. 102 
100. See, e.g., Du, supra note 77, ~ 40. 
101. Notably, the incorporatedlunincorporated related distinction IS 
normatively somewhat problematic. The concerns stem from the fact that, if 
unincorporated PPMs are excluded from the TBT Agreement the effect is not to 
find them WTO inconsistent, but instead to evaluate them under the rules of the 
GATT alone. It is difficult to understand why the parties would have wanted to 
subject only incorporated PPMs to the TBT Agreement's disciplines. This is 
particularly curious since one would imagine that incorporated PPMs are 
typically more transparent with respect to regulatory purpose than are 
unincorporated PPMs. 
The Appellate Body might try to avoid this result by moving away from the 
path that the Asbestos report set it upon, as that report did not directly consider 
the issue of unincorporated PPMs; the Appellate Body still has ample room to 
maneuver in this way. Whatever the merits of changing course might be, 
however, the WTO's historically strong resort to textual literalism and respect 
for prior decisions makes it seem somewhat unlikely-though certainly not 
inconceivable-that it would abandon the incorporate/unincorporated distinction 
on normative grounds anytime soon. On the Dispute Settlement Body's 
historical bias in favor of textual arguments, see HENRIK HORN & JOSEPH H. H. 
WEILER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - TRADE DESCRIPTION OF SARDINES: TEXTUALISM 
AND ITS DISCONTENT (2005). 
102. EC-Asbestos, supra note 83, ~ 67. 
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While the above list of potential "product characteristics" is 
non-exhaustive, the fact that all of the listed "characteristics" are 
detectible in the final good or some element of its packaging 
suggests that the Appellate Body considered the term to be 
limited as such. And, if "product characteristics" includes only 
those features that are detectible in the finished good itself, it 
would seem to follow that only those PPMs that leave a trace in 
the finished good could reasonably be considered "related" to 
"product characteristics." The negotiating history seems to 
support this interpretationl03 and this is the approach advocated 
by many WTO members.104 If a panel or the Appellate Body 
itself were to adopt this stance, and also characterize the 
environmentally-geared PPMs in the RFS2 as unincorporated 
PPMs, the regulation would fall outside of the TBT Agreement's 
scope. In this case, biofuel policy-makers would be free from the 
constraints the TBT Agreements impose.105 
It is plausible, but not certain, that the PPMs of the RFS2 
would be deemed unincorporated. To understand why this is so, 
it is important to keep in mind that the RFS2 implements two 
separate environmentally-geared PPMs, each of which factors 
differently in the PPM paradigm. First, the regulation sets forth 
strict controls on the type of land from which biofuels feedstock 
can be harvested. These land-use restrictions bare no discernible 
connection to the physical good. Therefore, we can easily 
characterize land-use restrictions as unincorporated. The second 
type of PPM in the RFS2-the threshold lifecycle GHG emissions 
reductions-is more challenging to classify. Still, as described 
103. See WTO Secretariat, Negotiating History of the Coverage of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with regard to Labeling Requirements, 
Voluntary Standards, and Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to 
Product Characteristics, n 131, 146, G/TBT/W/ll (Aug. 29, 1995). 
104. See SIMONETTA ZARRILLI, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., MAKING 
CERTIFICATION WORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPlVIENT: THE CASE OF BIOFUELS 31, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DICT/TED/2008/1 (2008), available at 
http://www . unctad.org/en/doc s/di tcted20081_ en. pdf. 
105. As an aside, it is more likely that the term "standards" would be 
interpreted as covering non-product related PPMs. See Sanford E. Gaines, 
Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental-PPM Based Trade Measures? 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 384, 396-97 
(2002). 
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below, there are strong grounds to believe that this PPM should 
also be considered unincorporated. 
Biofuels' lifecycle GHG emissions are predominantly 
generated via derivative activities, such as the manufacturing 
process, transportation of the fuels, or land use changes that 
result from increased demand for feedstock. As none of these 
derivative sources of emissions are detectable in the finished 
product itself, they should be considered unincorporated. The 
only GHG emissions that are intrinsic to the final product, and 
are therefore "detectable," are tailpipe emissions, which comprise 
just a tiny fraction of the fuel's lifecycle emissions. To illustrate, 
tailpipe emissions account for approximately one percent of 
emissions from corn ethanol produced at plants using natural gas 
for process energyl06 and approximately two percent of emissions 
from rapeseed biodiesel produced at plants using natural gas.107 
As such, if a tribunal were to assess the gestalt of the lifecycle 
emissions-criteria to determine whether they "relate" to "product 
characteristics" it would likely find that they do not satisfy the 
definition of the term as laid down in the Asbestos ruling. Under 
this scenario, the RFS2 would be considered to fall outside of the 
TBT Agreement's scope. 
A tribunal may reach a different conclusion though if instead 
of focusing on the general character of the emissions 
requirements it chose to dis aggregate a fuel's lifecycle GHG 
emissions into its component inputs- land use changes, process 
energy, tailpipe emission, etc. Under this fragmented approach, 
one may conclude that because a single variable in the equation, 
tailpipe emissions, contributes to a fuel's lifecycle emissions, 
lifecycle GHG emissions "relate" to a "product characteristic." 
Andrew Mitchell and Christopher Tan adopted this approach in a 
paper analyzing the WTO consistency of the EU sustainability 
criteria. lOB 
106. U.s. EPA, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM (RFS2) REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS 470 fig. 2.6·2 (2010). 
107. See Supplemental Determination for Renewable Fuels Produced Under 
the RFS2 Program from Canola Oil, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,622, 59,62S·29 (Sept. 2S, 
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. SO). 
lOS. Mitchell and Tan, supra note 14, ~ 6. 
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However, the dis aggregated approach to characterizing 
lifecycle emissions is problematic because it is impossible to 
isolate those measures that regulate tailpipe emissions from 
those that regulate all other "unincorporated" sources of lifecycle 
emissions. As a result, the dis aggregated approach has the effect 
of bringing a huge portion of the RFS2 regulation within the TBT 
Agreement's jurisdiction based on only a fairly inconsequential 
part of the regulation. This seems excessively formalistic and 
calls into question the basis for maintammg the 
incorporated/unincorporated distinction. Mter all, it is hardly 
any easier to determine a fuel's lifecycle GHG emissions from 
examining the one-to-two percent of emissions released by the 
finished product than it is to determine the type of land on which 
its feedstock was grown. 
To date, neither the Appellate Body nor a panel has 
considered a case in which it has needed to dis aggregate a PPM 
in the manner described above in order to find grounds for 
applying one of the WTO Agreements. It thus remains unclear 
how the Appellate Body would respond if presented with the 
question in the context of biofuels regulations. Accordingly, for 
the sake of completeness, the remainder of the analysis proceeds 
on the perhaps dubious assumption that the environmental 
provisions of the RFS2 would in fact be classified as "technical 
regulations" and the TBT Agreement would therefore apply. 
h. "Conformity Assessment Procedures" 
Assuming, arguendo, that the environmentally-geared 
provisions of the RFS2 rule are "technical regulations," for the 
reasons described below, the compliance mechanisms challenged 
by UNICA appear to fit much more naturally within the 
definition of a "conformity assessment procedures" than 
"technical regulations." They should be analyzed accordingly. 
Annex 1.3 defines "conformity assessment procedures" as 
"[a]ny procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that 
relevant requirements in a technical regulation or standards are 
fulfilled."lo9 The related explanatory note further specifies that 
109. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at annex 1.3. 
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"[c]onformity assessment procedures include, inter alia, 
procedures for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation, 
verification and assurance of conformity; registration, 
accreditation and approval as well as their combinations."llo 
There is no case law directly interpreting this definition.lll 
Nonetheless, a plain language reading of the provision strongly 
suggests that the challenged compliance measures, which include 
obligations such as the requirement to complete additional attest 
engagements and to provide third-party engineering reports, fall 
within its reach. This conclusion gains support from the EC-
Trademarks decision. In that case, the panel found a series of 
inspection procedures fell outside of the scope of "technical 
regulation"ll2 and indicated that they should be classified as 
conformity assessment procedures instead.ll3 
Notably, the EC-Trademarks Panel report asserted that 
while a given regulatory measure may contain both a "technical 
regulation" and a "conformity assessment procedure" the two 
terms are distinct and mutually exclusive.ll4 Although this 
report was not appealed, denying the Appellate Body a chance to 
confirm or refute the Panel's view of the interplay between the 
two terms, it suggests that each component-part of a measure 
should be classified as either one or the other, but not both. As 
the specific compliance procedures challenged by UNI CA fit more 
naturally within the definition of "conformity assessment 
procedure," if the TBT Agreement applies, the measures should 
first and foremost be evaluated under Article 5. 
So, why might UNICA have treated the compliance 
mechanisms as technical regulations? Perhaps it was simply due 
to the fact that Article 2 received far more attention in the 
110. Id. (emphasis added). 
111. The Panel report in United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna II, DS381, which was due to be released in the 
summer of 2011, may provide further clarification on this matter. 
112. See EC-Trademarks, supra note 85, ~ 7.515. 
113. See id. ,-r 7.513 (stating, "we note that the explanatory note refers to 
'procedures for inspection' as an exmnple of conformity assessment 
procedures. This suggests that a procedure for inspection is not a technical 
regulation."). 
114. Id. ~ 7.512. 
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previous disputes than Article 5,115 making Article 2 more salient 
to UNICA commenters. It is also possible that the commenters 
anticipated certain strategic advantages to challenging the 
additional compliance mechanisms under Article 2 as opposed to 
Article 5. These strategic advantages are explored below. 
v. THE REGULATION OF "CONFORMITY 
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES" UNDER 
ARTICLE 5.1.1 AND 5.1.2 
Mimicking the design of TBT Article 2, TBT Article 5 begins 
with two prOVlSlOns which establish that: (1) conformity 
assessment procedures must comply with the national treatment 
and most-favored nation principles (Article 5.1.1); and (2) 
conformity assessment procedures must not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade (Article 5.1.2). As the analogues of Articles 2.1 
and 2.2, if UNICA were to have correctly identified the 
compliance measures as "conformity assessment procedures," 
they would have attacked the measures under Articles 5.1.1 and 
5.1.2 (either in place of their Article 2 claims or as alternative 
claims). The interaction between each of these Article 5 
provisions and the compliance regime that the RFS2 prescribes 
will be discussed in turn below. 
a_ TBT Article 5_1.1 
In its entirety, Article 5.1.1 reads: 
[Members shall ensure that] conformity assessment procedures 
are prepared, adopted and applied so as to grant access for 
suppliers of like products originating in the territories of other 
Members under conditions no less favourable than those 
accorded to suppliers of like products of national origin or 
originating in any other country in a comparable situation; access 
entails suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity under the 
rules of the procedure, including when foreseen by this 
115. Article 2 has been the subject of several high profile WTO disputes, 
including EC-Asbestos, EC-Sardines, EC-Trademark, and most recently, u.s.-
Clove Cigarettes. By contrast, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body has 
issued a holding that applies or interprets Article 5. 
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procedure, the possibility 
activities undertaken at the 
mark of the system.116 
to have conformity assessment 
site of facilities and to receive the 
When analyzing the similar national treatment obligation 
contained in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, both the U.S.-
Cloves Cigarettes Panel117 and the EC- Trademark Panel 
116. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 5.1.1. 
117. See Panel Report, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, ~ 7.296, WTIDS4061R (Sept. 2, 
2011). In September 2011, shortly before this article entered into production, a 
panel released its report in the U.S.-Cloves Cigarette dispute. In this report, the 
panel considered a number of matters of first impression concerning Articles 2.1 
and 2.2 of the TET Agreement. At issue in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes was a U.S. ban 
on the importation of flavored cigarettes, which studies have shown are 
particularly appealing to youths. See id. ,-r,-r 7.337-38. The U.S. measure 
banned all flavored cigarettes except for menthol cigarettes, large quantities of 
which are produced in the United States. Id.,-r 2.4. The stated purpose of the 
ban was to reduce youth smoking. Id.,-r 2.7. Indonesia, which is the primary 
producer of clove cigarettes, complained that, among other problems, the U.S. 
ban violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TET Agreement. Id. ~ 3.1. 
Although the panel ultimately concluded that the U.S. measure violated 
Art. 2.1, it seems to have collapsed some elements of a typical GATT XX claim 
into its Art. 2.1 analysis. In so doing, it interpreted the provision in a manner 
that affords a degree of deference to regulatory prerogative. Specifically, the 
panel acknowledged that preventing youth smoking was a legitimate objective 
and that this legitimate objective must be taken into account in evaluating a 2.1 
claim. Id.,-r 7.286. It further specified that a discriminatory measure that 
serves a legitimate objective could pass muster under TBT art. 2.1, "provided it 
respects the boundaries set forth in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement such as not 
being a measure more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective." Id. ,-r 7.290. The reason the panel ended up invalidating the U.S. 
measure is because it rejected the U.S. claim that differential treatment of clove 
and menthol cigarettes furthered the stated aim of reducing youth smoking. Id. 
,-r 7.287. In the panel's words, its finding was based on the fact that "the United 
States is not banning menthol cigarettes because it is not a type of cigarette 
with a characterizing flavour that appeals to youths, but rather because of the 
costs that might be incurred as a result of such a ban." Id. ,-r 7.289. One could 
imagine the panel using a similar rationale to strike down the measure under 
the chapeau of GATT XX, if it had considered the GATT XX defense. 
With the ink on this decision still barely dry, it is difficult to predict what 
its impact will be. At the time of this writing, neither party had indicated that 
it intended to appeal the decision but there was ample time left in the sixty-day 
window to do so. Particularly seeing as the panel report ruled on several issues 
of first impression, it is quite unclear how the Appellate Body would treat these 
issues on appeal. Furthermore, even if the decision were to stand, it is unclear 
how exactly it would prejudice a later tribunal's interpretation of the scope of 
Art. 5.1.1, which, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 139-141 infra, 
contains some notable textual differences from TBT 2.1. For these reasons, the 
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concluded that the basic elements of a violation of Article 2.1 
were: "that the measure at issue is a 'technical regulation'; that 
the imported and domestic products at issue are 'like products' 
within the meaning of that provision; and that the imported 
products are accorded 'less favourable' treatment than that 
accorded to like domestic products." 118 This three-prong test, 
which closely resembles that used to evaluate national treatment 
claims brought under GATT Article IlI:4119 is essentially just a 
recitation of the definitional elements contained in Article 2.1. As 
Article 5.1.1 shares these elements with Article 2.1, future 
tribunals would probably use a similar framework as a starting 
point for their analysis of Article 5.1.1. However, there would be 
two important alterations. 
The first alteration is obviously that a measure would have to 
satisfy the definition of "conformity assessment procedure" rather 
than "technical regulation." The difference between these two 
terms has already been discussed at length above.120 The second 
alteration is that "likeness," which has played such a prominent 
role in the GATT IlI:4 jurisprudence, is unlikely to receive much 
attention here. Since the very goal of conformity assessment 
procedures is to ensure uniformity in a category of products, it 
seems the defending party would generally find it difficult to 
claim the foreign products are "unlike." 
The element likely to occupy much more of the litigants' 
attention in a potential 5.1.1 analysis, and be most controversial, 
remainder of this article takes somewhat of a detached approach to the legal 
conclusions reached in the U.S.-Clove Cigarettes panel report. The panel's 
statements on relevant issues will be diligently noted throughout, however; no 
attempt has been made to ensure that the discussion about Arts. 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 
precisely tracks the Panel's assessment of Arts. 2.1 and 2.2. 
118. EC-Trademark, supra note 85, ,-r 7.444. See U.S-Clove Cigarettes, supra 
note 87, n 7.76·78. 
119. See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ~ 133, WTIDSI611ABIR, WTIDS169/ABIR (Dec. 11, 
2000) [hereinafter Korea-BeefJ (stating that "[f]or a violation of Article I1I:4 to be 
established, three elements must be satisfied: that the imported and domestic 
products at issue are 'like products'; that the measure at issue is a 'law, 
regulation, or requirement affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use'; and that the imported products 
are accorded 'less favourable' treatment than that accorded to like domestic 
products."). 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96 and 109-114. 
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is that of "less favourable treatment." With no case law directly 
on point,121 there remains considerable uncertainty about how to 
interpret this prohibition. Perhaps the most fundamental 
question facing any tribunal interpreting the less favorable 
treatment prohibition is, how much weight should be accorded to 
the jurisprudence that has developed under Article IlI:4 of the 
GATT? One option is to simply equate the prohibition contained 
in Article IlI:4 with that of Article 5.1.1 and directly apply the 
jurisprudence that has developed under Article IlI:4 to the TBT 
Agreement.122 In the alternative, a tribunal could perform a 
more context-specific analysis of the term as used in Article 5.1.1, 
acknowledging the jurisprudence that has developed under the 
GATT, while also tailoring its interpretation to reflect the 
particularized goals of the TBT Agreement and the specific text 
that Article 5.1.1 provides. The doctrinal pros and cons of each of 
these options, as well as the consequences for the RFS2, will be 
elaborated upon below. As will be explained, the first route 
carries several hazards-even more so with respect to Article 
5.1.1 than Article 2.1-and should be avoided. The second option 
side-steps these hazards and is therefore preferable. 
L Interpretative option #1: Equivalence to GATT 
IlI:4 
If a tribunal were to take the first route and directly apply 
the Article IlI:4 jurisprudence to Article 5.1.1, it would in all 
likelihood prove fatal to the RFS2. The reasoning behind this 
stark assessment is as follows: 
Although the precise formulation of the test has ebbed and 
flowed over the years,123 the central question posed by a GATT 
IlI:4 less favorable treatment inquiry has traditionally been 
whether the measure "modifies the conditions of competition to 
the detriment of importers."124 In an early WTO-era dispute, 
121. See supra note 115, with accompanying text. 
122. U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 18, ~ 7.91. 
123. For a detailed description of the vicissitudes of the Appellate Body's 
national treatment jurisprudence, see Nicolas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, 
Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart of Two Sides 
of the Same Coin? 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 63·65 (2008). 
124. See Korea-Beef, supra note 119, ~ 144. 
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Korea-Beef, the Appellate Body explained that while Article IlI:4 
does not per se prohibit measures that treat foreign and domestic 
goods differently, it does prohibit measures distinguishing 
between foreign and domestic goods to the disadvantage of the 
foreign goods.125 In the years since Korea-Beef, the Appellate 
Body has refined and seemingly relaxed the rigor of the 
competition-based standard with respect to facially origin neutral 
measures.126 However, as the RFS2 explicitly discriminates 
between biofuel producers on the basis of their nationality, it 
could not be considered origin neutral and would most likely be 
evaluated under the cruder competition standard that Korea-Beef 
set forth. Under this standard, presuming Brazil127 could 
demonstrate that the additional compliance obligations imposed 
on foreign producers materially alter the conditions of 
competition to the detriment of imported products, the measures 
would be found to violate GATT IlI:4.128 Consequently, they 
would violate Article 5.1.1 as well. 
125. See id. ~ 144. See also EC-Asbestos, supra note 83, ~ 100. 
126. See Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the 
Import and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ~ 96, WTIDS302/ABIR (Apr. 25, 2005) 
[hereinafter Dominican Republic-Cigarettes] (stating that claims of "less 
favourable treatment" will not be sustained "if the detrimental effect is 
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the 
product."). 
127. Only WTO Members have standing to bring cases before the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO. See generally Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 
1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (considering only the rights of member states to bring 
cases before the dispute settlement system). For this reason, Brazil, rather than 
UNleA, would have to be the party to argue this hypothetical case against the 
United States. 
128. Regarding facially discriminatory measures, Robert Howse et al., have 
written: "Based on the case law on Article III of the GATT, there is little 
question but that it mandates that explicitly or facially discriminate in favor of 
domestic products over imports, for instance through requiring that the man-
date be fulfilled in whole or in part using domestically -sourced biofuels would 
violate Article IlI:4 of the GATT." HOWSE ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined., at 25 (emphasis added). 
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ii. Interpretative option #2: Something narrower 
than GATT 111:4 
The good news for the United States in this hypothetical 
dispute is that there is good reason to believe the interpretation 
of the "less favourable treatment" prohibition of Article 5.1.1 
should deviate from that of GATT 111:4. In fact, the recent U.S-
Clove Cigarettes Panel appeared aware of the pitfalls that direct 
application of the GATT jurisprudence poses, repeatedly stressing 
the need to employ a context-specific approach for interpreting 
Article 2.1.129 As will be described, the arguments against direct 
transposition are even stronger with respect to Article 5.1.1 than 
Article 2.1. 
The first argument against the direct equivalence approach 
derives from the language of the TBT Agreement preamble. 
Specifically, the second recital of the TBT Agreement states that 
the Agreement "[desires] to further the objectives of the 
GATT."13o This language implies that where possible, the TBT 
Agreement should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
rights and obligations to which the parties committed themselves 
under the GATT. Paragraph 6 of the preamble, which was 
modeled after GATT Article XX,131 reiterates the need for 
129. See e.g., U.S-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 7.117 ("we conclude that 
our approach to interpreting Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement must ensure that 
the TBT Agreement is addressed first as immediate context of Article 2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement. The jurisprudence under Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994, 
which provision also serves as context albeit not immediate, may also be 
considered."). See also U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 254 C[w]hile we 
agree with the parties that the similarity in wording [between TET 2.1 and 
GATT IlI:4] must be given weight, we do so cautiously because, as noted by the 
Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos, even to the extent that the terms used are 
identical, they 'must be interpreted in light of the context and of the object and 
purpose, of the provision at issue, and of the object and purpose of the covered 
agreement in which the provision appears."'). 
130. TET Agreement, supra note 9, ~ 2. Notably, both the EC-Trademarks 
and U. S. -Clove Cigarettes panel reports acknowledged that the second preamble 
recital provided relevant context for interpreting TBT 2.1. See EC-Trademarks, 
supra note 85, ~ 7.464 and U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ~ 7.116 Gointly 
referring to the second and sixth preambular recitals). 
131. See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 7.360. See also EC-Asbestos, 
supra note 83, ,-r 855 n.41 ("the preparatory work on the Agreement to Technical 
Barriers to Trade in the Tokyo Round show that the TBT Agreement that 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/3
2011] ENSURING BIOFUELS 115 
symbiotic interpretation of the two agreements by recalling 
member states' right to maintain policies of the sort that are 
protected by Article XX.132 Without a general exception provision 
in the TBT Agreement which approximates that found in the 
GATT, equating the scope and stringency of the less favorable 
treatment prohibition in the TBT Agreement with that in Article 
IlI:4 could produce awkwardly incongruent outcomes between the 
two agreements, with the TBT Agreement denying Members the 
right to maintain regulations which Article XX of the GATT 
expressly permits.133 Such a result would seem to flout the 
directives given in the two aforementioned recitals of the 
preamble. 
The most natural way in which tribunals interpreting Article 
5.1.1 can circumvent this sort of conflict is to narrow the scope of 
the less favorable treatment inquiry under Article 5.1.1 as 
compared with Article IlI:4. Fortunately, the text of Article 5.1.1 
provides clear guidance on how it should be constrained: whereas 
GATT IlI:4, 134 like TBT Article 2.1,135 blanketly prohibits 
technical regulations from according "less favorable" treatment, 
Article 5.1.1 confines itself to ensurmg that conformity 
should have emerged from the Tokyo Round was already seen as being a 
development of the existing rules of the GATT, notably Article XX."). 
132. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at prmbl. ,-r 6. 
133. Marceau & Trachtman made a similar observation regarding the 
relationship between Article 2.1 of the TET Agreement and the GATT: 
Problems may occur if the scope of the term 'like products' is the 
same as that under Article IIl:4, which the justifications under 
Article XX are not available to violations of Article 2.1 TET. It is 
conceivable that the 'accordion' of like products may allow a 
distinction between 'like' products of GATT Article III (or I) and that 
of 2.1 TBT. The emphasis of the Appellate Body on the 'no less 
favourable' language may serve as a less strained defence for non-
protectionist domestic regulation and therefore reduce the need to 
invoke Article XX to justify measures based on listed non-
protectionist policy goal. Otherwise we would be faced with an 
incongruous situation where for instance many of the environment-
based technical regulations could be inconsistent with Article 2.1 
while the same regulations would be authorized by Article XX (after 
a prior determination that it was prima facie inconsistent with 
Article IlI:4 of GATT. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 822-
23 (internal citation omitted). 
134. See supra note 50 with accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 52 with accompanying text. 
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assessment procedures grant foreign suppliers "access" that is "no 
less favorable" than that granted to domestic suppliers. The 
second sentence of Article 5.1.1 gives color to the meaning of 
"access" as used in this context by explaining it "entails a 
suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity under the rules of 
the procedure."136 This specification strongly indicates that the 
primary aim of Article 5.1.1 is to discipline states who resist 
applying published conformity assessment procedures to a foreign 
product in order to block entry into the national market place. 
The list of requirements in Article 5.2, which are designed to 
"implement the provisions of Paragraph 1," supports this process-
oriented interpretation by focusing on matters such as ensuring 
that states publish how they will carry out a conformity 
assessment procedure.137 Moreover, the fact that the drafters 
elected not to use the word "include" or "inter alia:' before the 
specification provided by the second sentence of Article 5.1.1, as 
they did in the second sentence of Article 5.1.2, suggests they may 
have intended 5.1.1 to be limited to this purpose. 
Stated differently, Article 5.1.1 could reasonably be read as 
requiring Members to faithfully implement their published 
conformity assessment procedures to evaluate foreign goods in a 
fair manner, but not to ensure that the assessment procedures 
devised impose equal burdens on all parties. Under this reading, 
the latter investigation would be reserved for Article IlI:4, which, 
covering all "laws, regulations and requirements,"138 would 
almost certainly govern conformity assessment procedures as 
wel1.139 If this interpretation were adopted, the challenged RFS2 
136. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 5.1.1 (emphasis added). 
137. Id. at art. 5.2. 
138. GATT, supra note 8, at art. 111:4. 
139. Notably, Robert Howse and Elizabeth Turk envisioned a similar division 
of responsibility between TET 2.1 and GATT IlI:4. See HOWSE & TURK, supra 
note 77, at 309. In their scheme, TET 2.1 is read as calling for a due process-
type inquiry into the regulatory process that was used to generate conformity 
assessment procedures and how they are currently applied. See HOWSE & TURK, 
supra note 77, at 309. GATT IlI:4, by contrast, provides an opportunity to 
investigate whether the conformity assessment procedures as designed accord 
"less favourable treatment." HOWSE & TURK, supra note 77, at 309; see also Du, 
supra note 77, ,-r 30 (describing the procedural nature of the obligations imposed 
by the TET Agreement as compared to the GATT). 
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provisions might very well be consistent with Article 5.1.1, so 
long as they were applied in practice as promised on paper. 
Some might suspect this reading gives Article 5.1.1 a more 
limited scope than is credible. But guaranteeing that members 
have the right to have their products fairly assessed under the 
published procedure is far from a trivial concern. In fact, the 
EC's foot-dragging in assessing whether genetically modified 
organisms should be approved for sale in the EU was the focus of 
the EC-Biotechs140 dispute. Although EC-Biotechs was primarily 
an SPS case, rather than a TBT case, it illustrates the havoc that 
a failure to apply a given conformity assessment procedure can 
reap on international trade. 
b_ Article 5_1.2 
Like Article 5.1.1, the prohibition against "unnecessary 
obstacles to trade" in Article 5.1.2 closely resembles its Article 2 
analogue. In fact, save for the substitution of the phrase 
"technical regulation" for "conformity assessment procedure," the 
first sentences of the two provisions are identical. Article 5.1.2 
provides: 
[Member shall ensure that] conformity assessment procedures 
are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the 
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
This means, inter alia, that conformity assessment procedures 
shall not be more strict or be applied more strictly than is 
necessary to give the importing Member adequate confidence 
that products conform with the applicable technical regulations 
or standards, taking account of the risks non-conformity would 
create.141 
The text of this provision is inherently open-ended and prior 
to the U.S.-Clove Cigarettes dispute, neither Article 5.1.2 nor the 
analogous Article 2.2 had been rigorously analyzed by a WTO 
140. See EC-Biotechs, supra note 75. The EC-Biotech Panel report determined 
that the EC had implemented a de facto moratorium on approving GMOs, which 
caused "undue delay" in the processing of GMO product applications in violation 
of Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement. See EC-Biotechs, supra note 75, 
~ 8.6·.7. 
141. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 5.1.2. 
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panel or the Appellate Body.142 However, it is notable that 
Article 5.1.2 closely resembles Article XX(b)-(d) of the GATT. 143 
Furthermore, as the US-Clove Cigarettes panel observed in 
analyzing Article 2.2, the sixth recital of the preamble to the TBT 
Agreement, which provides context for interpreting Article 5.1.2, 
"essentially reproduces the language contained in Article XX of 
the GATT 1994."144 Accordingly, in contrast to Article 5.1.1, 
interpreting Article 5.1.2 in a manner which tracks the 
jurisprudence that has developed under the complementary 
article of the GATT, supports the goals expressed in the preamble 
of the TBT Agreement.145 For these reasons, and as the panel 
found in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes with respect to Article 2.2,146 the 
prohibition against unnecessary obstacles to trade in Article 5.1.2 
should be interpreted in a manner which accords with the 
tribunals' understanding of the word "necessity" as the word is 
used in the Article XX(b)-(d) of the GATT.147 In consequence, this 
section examines current jurisprudence on the meaning of 
"necessity" under GATT Article XX. 
142. See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ~ 7.329 n.614 (noting the lack of 
prior case law concerning Article 2.2). 
143. See id. ~ 7.358 (describing the similarity between GATT Article XX and 
TET 2.2). Together with its chapeau, Article XX reads: "Subject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health." GATT, supra note 8, Art. XX. 
144. U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ~ 7.368. 
145. See supra notes 141-144 with accompanying text. 
146. See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87,,-r 7.368. 
147. Notably, as Indonesia asserted in the U.S.-Clove Cigarettes dispute, all 
third parties who addressed the issue in their submissions and oral arguments 
supported the notion that the jurisprudence on Article XX(b) of the GATT could 
be applied to Article 2.2 of the TET Agreement. U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra 
note 87, ,-r 7.314. The United States alone took issue with this approach, 
arguing that the panel should instead apply the test that had been developed to 
analyze claims brought under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. See U.S.-Clove 
Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 7.353. 
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i. The concept of necessi ty under the GATT and 
Article 5.1.2 
119 
In its Brazil- Tyres report, the Appellate Body articulated a 
two·step inquiry to the question of "necessity" under Article 
XX(b).14B In the first step, a panel must "assess all the relevant 
factors, particularly the extent of the contribution to the 
achievement of a measure's objective and its trade 
restrictiveness, in light of the importance of the interests or 
values at stake."149 If the balancing test performed in the first 
stage of analysis "yields a preliminary conclusion that the 
measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing 
the measure with its possible alternatives."150 A measure will 
not be deemed "necessary" if there is a reasonably available 
alternative that is less trade· restrictive and affords an equivalent 
degree of protection.151 
In explaining how to operationalize this "least restrictive 
alternative" test-which is included in the text of 5.1.2 almost 
verbatim-the Appellate Body emphasized that, "in order to 
qualify as an alternative, a measure proposed by the complaining 
Member must not only [be] less trade restrictive than the 
measure at issue, but should also 'preserve for the responding 
Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with 
respect to the objective pursued."'152 It continued to explain that: 
"if the complaining Member has put forward a possible 
alternative measure, the responding Member may seek to show 
that the proposed measure does not allow it to achieve the level of 
148. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, WTIDS332/ABIR (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil-Tyres]. 
149. Id. ~ 156. See also Korea-Beef, supra note 119, ~ 164 (stating that an 
assessment of necessity under GATT Art. XX(d) involves "a process of weighing 
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution 
made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at 
issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or 
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or 
exports."). 
150. Brazil-Tyres, supra note 148, ,-r 156. 
151. Brazil-Tyres, supra note 148, ,-r 156. 
152. Id. (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ~ 308, WTIDS285/ABIR 
(Apr. 72005)). 
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protection it has chosen and, therefore, is not a genume 
alternative." Thus, the Appellate Body will not allow one 
Member to undermine another's chosen level of protectiveness by 
forcing the defending Member to choose an alternative that 
affords any lesser degree of protection than it has chosen for 
itself. 
As applied to the RFS2, whether or not the asymmetrical 
compliance procedures should be considered "unnecessary" under 
5.1.2 depends on a factual assessment of the equivalence of any 
measure that Brazil or another complainant put forward. The 
case law makes clear, however, that the trade-restrictive U.S. 
regime does not in any way pre-judge a violation of 5.1.2. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Asymmetrical compliance procedures of the sort the RFS2 
prescribes should not be considered per se prohibited by the TBT 
Agreement. In order to find that the TBT Agreement even 
applies to the matter at hand, a tribunal would have to either 
bring unincorporated PPMs within the ambit of the Agreement or 
endorse what has been termed the dis aggregated approach to 
evaluating whether a PPM is unincorporated. Both moves would 
set it in unchartered waters. Moreover, if the TBT Agreement 
were found to apply, there is still room in the letter of Articles 
5.1.1 or 5.1.2 for a tribunal to permit a state to impose disparate 
burdens on foreign and domestic suppliers where doing so IS 
genuinely necessary to advance a legitimate objective. 
To be sure, cavernous lacunae remain in the TBT 
jurisprudence and it is difficult to predict how future tribunals 
will interpret the restrictions of either Article 2 or Article 5. Yet 
should they wish to take a restrained approach and protect the 
careful balance between regulatory autonomy and trade 
facilitation that is enshrined in the GATT, they will find ample 
room to do so. 
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